Introduction
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) has been one of the most important security properties for authenticated key exchange (AKE). This property has a long research history that can date back to the work [1] by Diffie et al. in 1992 . Nowadays (perfect) forward secrecy is often considered as a desired fundamental security property for protecting the confidentiality and implicit authentication of session key, which has been incorporated into various formal AKE security models [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . Roughly speaking, protocols with PFS should guarantee that the compromise of long-term key would not affect the confidentiality of previously established session keys.
However, it is often the case that protocols satisfying PFS are much harder to build than those which dispense with it. This fact is particularly prominent in the construction of an one-round key exchange (ORKE) protocol. Before the work by Boyd and Nieto [7] in 2011, achieving PFS for two-message key exchange was once thought to be an impossible mission (e.g. in [5] ). Therefore, an alternative notion called weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS) is defined in [5] . In the later, a very strong security model called as eCK [6] was proposed to cover various leakage combinations of long-term and ephemeral secret keys. However, only wPFS is formulated in the eCK model. The problem of modeling PFS for two-message key exchange in an eCK like model was overcome by Cremers and Feltz [4] who proposed a so-called eCK-PFS model. In PKC 2015, Bergsma et al. [2] particularly aimed to construct an one-round key exchange protocol (which is a special class of two-message key exchange) in the eCK-PFS model. A generic protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) is proposed based on non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) [8] , digital signature (SIG) and pseudo-random function (PRF). As claimed by Bergsma et al. that achieving the PFS security attribute is one of the primary motivations of the BJS scheme. In this paper, we are interested in the validity of the security proof of the BJS scheme in the eCK-PFS model. Note that a security proof is useful if and only if it has no attack under the security model wherein it is analyzed. The problem of verifying the correctness of computational complexity proof for a protocol itself is non-trivial, especially under a strong security model. Many works (e.g. [9, 10, 11] ) have shown that any active attack overlooked during the security analysis may trivially invalidate the corresponding security proofs.
OUR RESULTS. We revisit the security result of the BJS scheme. We discover that the BJS scheme is actually not secure in the eCK-PFS model under which it was proved. The main problem here is that the session key material which is expected to provide PFS is not specifically bound to each session. In this case, the adversary can result in two sessions without matching sessions (non-partnered), e.g., denoted by π which is computed based on the ephemeral public keys epk id 1 and epk id 2 . Unfortunately, we figure out that, after compromising the long-term keys of session participants, the secret k
can be extracted from the session key of π
. This would enable the adversary to break the PFS property of the BJS scheme. We will describe the concrete attack in Section 4. An improved scheme is proposed to circumvent our PFS attack. In the improvement, we change the key derivation function (KDF) of k
(and other important keying materials) by putting all protocol messages and identities of communication partners into it. Namely, the intermediate key k
is generated based on the ephemeral secrets together with the protocol messages and identities. We stress that binding identities to k
is important as well. Since it could resist with the unknown key share attacks [14] . We hope that our security analysis would be helpful for avoiding such mistakes in the future similar works.
Preliminaries
General Notations. We let λ ∈ N be the security parameter and 1 λ be a string that consists of λ ones. We write [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N to denote the set of integers between 1 and n. The notation a $ ← S denotes the operation which samples a uniformly random element from a set S. Assume IDS be an identity space. Let K AKE be the key space of session key. Those spaces are associated with security parameter λ.
Digital Signature Schemes
We consider a digital signature scheme SIG that consists of three probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms SIG = (SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vfy) which associate with public and secret key spaces {PK SIG , SK SIG }, message space M SIG , a secret randomness space RS SIG and signature space S SIG in the security parameter λ. These algorithms are defined as follows:
• (sk, vk) ← SIG.Gen(1 λ , rs): This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and a randomness rs ∈ RS SIG , and outputs a (public) verification key vk ∈ PK SIG and a secret signing key sk ∈ SK SIG ;
• σ $ ← SIG.Sign(sk, m): This is the signing algorithm that generates a signature σ ∈ S SIG for a message m ∈ M SIG with signing key sk;
• {0, 1} ← SIG.Vfy(vk, m, σ): This is the verification algorithm that on input a verification key vk, a message m and the corresponding signature σ, and outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature for m under key vk, and 0 otherwise.
Let SIG(sk, ·) be a signing oracle which takes as input a message m and returns a signature σ ← SIG.Sign(sk, m). Meanwhile, we may use a list Slist to record each signing oracle query in a form (m i , σ i ), i.e., the input and output of the i-th signing oracle query. where SIG is a negligible function in λ.
Pseudo-Random Functions
A pseudo-random function family is denoted by PRF : K PRF × D PRF → R PRF , where K PRF is the key space, D PRF is the domain and R PRF is the range of PRF for security parameter λ. Let PList be a list to store the messages queried in the following PRF oracle FN .
Definition 2. The pseudo-random function family PRF is said to be a (q f , t, PRF )-secure, if the probability | Pr[EXP ind-cma PRF,B (λ) = 1]−1/2| ≤ PRF holds for all adversaries B = (B 1 , B 2 ) that make a polynomial number q f of oracle queries while running within time t in the following experiment without failure:
* ∈ PList then return a failure ⊥;
where PRF = PRF (λ) is a negligible function in the security parameter λ, and the number of allowed queries q f is bound by t.
Non-Interactive Key Exchange Protocols
We first review the simplified notion of NIKE presented in [12, Appendix G] . Let IDS NIKE denote an identity space and K NIKE denote a shared key space in association with security parameter. A PKI-based Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) scheme consists of three algorithms: NIKE.Setup, NIKE.Gen and ShKey, in which those algorithms are defined as follows:
• pms nike ← NIKE.Setup(1 λ ): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs system parameters pms nike . The parameters pms nike might be implicitly used by other algorithms for simplicity.
• (sk, pk) ← NIKE.Gen(er): This algorithm takes as input a randomness er $ ← R NIKE chosen from a space R NIKE , and outputs a pair of long-term secret and public key (sk, pk).
• K ← ShKey(sk i , pk j ): This algorithm takes as input a secret key sk i and a public key pk j , and outputs a shared key K i,j ∈ K NIKE . For a tuple of key pairs (sk i , pk i ) and (sk j , pk j ), the algorithm ShKey must hold the following correctness condition:
Security Notion of NIKE. We here recall the CKS-light formal security model [8] for two party PKI-based non-interactive key-exchange (NIKE). We first describe the security experiment in the following. EXP
cks-light
NIKE,A (λ): On input security parameter λ, the security experiment is executed between a challenger C and an adversary A based on a non-interactive key exchange protocol NIKE. Let HID and DID be two lists recording information (e.g. secret and public key pair) of honest users and dishonest users respectively. In the security experiment, the following steps are proceeded:
1. The challenger C first generates the system parameters pms nike according to the protocol specification and gives pms nike to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A may ask C with the following queries:
• RegH(i): If i ∈ {HID, DID} a failure symbol ⊥ is returned; Otherwise, C generates a long-term key pair (sk i , pk i ) ∈ (PK, SK) by running NIKE.Gen(er) and adds the tuple (i, sk i , pk i ) into the list HID. C gives pk i to A.
• RegC nike (j, pk j ): If j / ∈ HID, C allows the adversary to register an dishonest long-term public key pk j , and records the tuple (j, pk j ) into the list DID. If the adversary makes multiple queries for a particular index j, in which case C only keeps the most recent record.
• EXT(i): If i ∈ HID, then C returns the secret key sk i .
• RevealKey nike (i, j): If both i and j are recorded in the list DID, C returns a failure symbol ⊥; Otherwise, C runs ShKey using one of the honest secret keys in (sk i , sk j ) and the public key of the other party, and returns the generated key to A.
• Test nike (i * , j * ): C returns a failure symbol ⊥ if either i * = j * or i * / ∈ HID or j * / ∈ HID; Otherwise, C samples a random bit b $ ← {0, 1} and answers this query according to the bit b. Specifically, C obtains the real shared key K 1 := ShKey(sk i * , pk j * ) and chooses a random key K 0 $ ← K NIKE . Then C returns K b to the adversary. This query can be queried at most one time. 
is some negligible probability in the security parameter λ.
Security Model
In this section, we describe the eCK-PFS model as [4, 2] for two-message authenticated keyexchange (AKE). In order to emulate the protocol executions in the real world, we provide active adversaries with an 'execution environment' as in [2, 15] . Specifically, the protocol executions of a set of honest users (that an adversary may attack) are represented by a collection of oracles {π
where each oracle π s id i behaves as the party id i carrying out a process to execute the s-th protocol instance (session) and all oracles can be run sequentially and concurrently. We assume that all identities and corresponding public keys are stored in a public directory PD that can be accessed by all oracles. In the real world, such public directory could be like certificate authority. In order to keep track of the execution status, we assume each oracle π In literature [2] , the authors particularly use the public key as identity. However, in the real life, the adversary may simply register a party who has the same public key with that of another honest party. In this case, a party may not be uniquely identified. Therefore, in our model, we only require that the identity id is some unique string (e.g., some sequential index). The identity of an honest party should not be manipulated by an adversary. In order to describe the problem of the BJS scheme, we try to keep our model to be consistent with the model of [2] as much as possible.
An active adversary A in the model is formulated as a PPT Turing Machine taking as input the security parameter 1 λ and public information (e.g. generic description of the above environment and all public keys of honest parties). The capabilities of active adversaries are formulated by allowing them to issue the following queries:
• Send(id i , s, m): The adversary can use this query to send any message m of his own choice to the oracle π
will respond with the next message m * (if any) to be sent according to the protocol specification and its internal states. The oracle π s id i would be initiated via sending it the first message m = ( , id j ) consisting of a special initialization symbol and a value id j . The id j is either the identity id j of the intended partner or an empty string ∅. After answering a Send query, the variables (pid
) will be updated depending on the specific protocol. • RevealEphKey(id i , s): The oracle π s id i responds with the per-session randomness used to generate ephemeral public key.
• Corrupt(id i , pk * ): If i ∈ [ ] this query responds with the honest long-term secret key sk id i (corresponding to the original sk id i ) of the party id i , and the current public key pk id i stored in the public directory PD is replaced with the new pk * of adversary's choice; otherwise a failure symbol ⊥ is returned. After this query, the party id i is called corrupted and all unstopped oracles of id i can answer other queries using its old public/secret key pair. But no more oracle of id i can be initiated since then.
•
Secure AKE Protocols:
We here first review the notion regarding partnership of two sessions, i.e. matching sessions and origin session [2] .
We first recall the notion of origin session [2] which is useful to formulate the relationship between the message generator and its receiver. received a protocol message which does not include any information about its generator, then such message may not come from its intended partner. We now recall the matching sessions defined in [2] .
Definition 5 (Matching Sessions
has sent all protocol messages and all the following conditions are held:
CORRECTNESS. We say an AKE protocol
In order to define security, we review the notion of oracle freshness (which is called eCK-PFS rules in [2] ) that describes the active attacks allowed in the eCK-PFS model. 
If π t id j
exists, A queried RevealKey(id j , t).
3.
A queried both Corrupt(id i , pk id i ) and RevealEphKey(id i , s).
If π z
idv exists, A queried both Corrupt(id j , pk id j ) and RevealEphKey(id v , l). 5. If π z idv does not exist, A queried Corrupt(id j , pk id j ) prior to the acceptance of π s id i . Remark 1. The oracle freshness definition always plays a very important and fundamental role in the security model, which is used to not only formulate the queries that are allowed in the following security experiment but also exclude some trivial attacks. However, some trivial attacks might be obscure and easy to be ignored. Overlooking any of them may lead the underlying security model to be obsolete. Unfortunately we notice that the eCK-PFS rules defined in [2] is such a negative example. And no protocol can be secure under their definition. We here recall one of the eCK-PFS rules that: If π s id i has an origin session π t id j , then it does not hold that both Corrupted j ≤ τ and A asked RevealEphKey(id j , t), where τ ∈ N is a variable recording the τ -query when π s id i is accepted, and Corrupted j ∈ N is a similar variable recording the Corrupted j -th query when id j is corrupted. This rule implies that the adversary is allowed to ask both Corrupt(id j ) and RevealEphKey(id j , t) after the τ -th query. The RevealEphKey query is performed exactly the same as RevealRand defined in [2] . However, after querying both Corrupt(id j ) and RevealEphKey(id j , t) the adversary can obtain all necessary secrets for generating the final session key of the test oracle. Actually, if π
has an origin session π t id j , the adversary should be forbidden to ask both Corrupt(id j ) and RevealEphKey(id j , t) throughout the security experiment (nor just before some point).
Remark 2. Furthermore, the eCK-PFS model defined in [2] is not totally consistent with the original one introduced in [4] , in particularly for the use of identity. Unlike [4] , the identity is not considered in the definition of matching sessions. This difference may hinder us to examine the important attacks that are relevant to identity (such as the unknown key share attacks [14] ) under such a variant of eCK-PFS model [2] .
SECURITY EXPERIMENT EXP
AKE Π,A (λ): On input security parameter 1 λ , the security experiment is proceeded as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A based on a AKE protocol Π, where the following steps are performed:
1. At the beginning of the game, the challenger C implements the collection of oracles {π
, and generates long-term key pairs (pk id i , sk id i ) for all honest parties id i for i ∈ [ ] where the identity id i ∈ IDS of each party is chosen uniquely. C gives the adversary A all identities and public keys {(id 1 , pk id 1 ), . . . , (id , pk id )} as input.
2.
A may issue a polynomial number of queries regarding Send, RevealEphKey, Corruptand RevealKey.
3. At some point, A may issue a Test(id i , s) query during the game at most once.
4. At the end of the game, A may terminate and output a bit b as its guess for b of Test(id i , s) query. Then the experiment would return a failure symbol ⊥ if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) A has not issued a Test(id i , s) query; (ii) the Test(id i , s) query returns a failure symbol ⊥; (iii) the test oracle is not fresh.
5. Finally, the experiment returns 1 if b = b ; Otherwise, 0 is returned.
Definition 7 (eCK-PFS Security). We say that an adversary A (t, )-breaks the eCK-PFS security of a correct AKE protocol Π, if for any A who runs the AKE security experiment EXP AKE Π,A (λ) within time t and without failure, it holds that | Pr[EXP AKE Π,A (λ) = 1] − 1/2| > . We say that a correct AKE protocol Π is (t, )-session-key-secure, if there exists no adversary that (t, )-breaks the eCK-PFS security of Π.
The Insecurity and Improvement of the BJS scheme
In this section, we describe the insecurity of the BJS scheme [2] . We first review the BJS scheme in Figure 1 . In the presentation slides [16] of the BJS scheme in PKC 2015, the exchanged signatures are included within the transcript T . However, this change would not change the insecurity of the BJS scheme. Furthermore, [2, equation (4)] (i.e., k epk id 1 epk id 2 := ShKey(esk id 1 , epk id 2 )) is not consistent with its counterpart (i.e., k Fig.2.] . However, neither of them is secure. We here just recall [2, Fig.2 .] for simplicity. 
The PFS attack against BJS Scheme
In the following, we present an attack against the perfect forward secrecy of the BJS scheme. We just exploit the Corrupt(id i , pk * id i ) query which returns the original secret key of id i . However, we stress that we do not need to change the public key of an honest party via the Corrupt query in the following PFS attack. The attack idea is to result in two oracles π s id 1 and π t id 2 generating the same keying material (i.e., the one computed by only ephemeral secrets) without breaking the eCK-PFS freshness.
Lemma 1. There exists some adversary A which (t, 1)-breaks the eCK-PFS security the BJS protocol.
The concrete PFS attack steps are presented as below:
1. The adversary A chooses two arbitrary target oracles π to execute the protocol instance, and intercepts (epk
) to get the long-term secret key sk id 3 = (sk
), where pk * id 3
could be identical to its original one.
to execute the protocol instance, and intercepts (epk
4.
A generates the signature σ * id 3 := SIG.Sign(sk
).
A sends (epk
, and forwards (epk
6. Note that, at this moment, the oracle π
has an origin oracle π 
. Now the goal of the adversary is to get the keying material
. This is possible. Since A is able to compute k . Then we have k
, A is able to compute the real session key K
, where the key value k
can be computed using the secret keys sk The above attack is valid in the eCK-PFS model [2] , since the test oracle π s id 1 is executed under the eCK-PFS rules. Note that A neither asked RevealEphKey(id 1 , s) nor RevealEphKey(id 2 , t). But the oracle π t id 2 , which holds the same keying material of the test oracle π s id 1 , has no matching session to π s id 1 . Therefore, the RevealKey query to π t id 2 does not break the eCK-PFS freshness. Note also that the above attack against the BJS scheme holds in any AKE model wherein the PFS attacks and known session key attacks are formulated (e.g., [3] ). As in our PFS attack, we do not make use of RevealEphKey query at all.
An Improvement Solution of the BJS Scheme
The main problem of the BJS scheme is that the protocol message transcript is not bound to the keying material generated involving only ephemeral public keys. Our remedy is straightforward that we put all exchanged messages and identities of session participants into the key derivation function, i.e. PRF, to generate all keying materials including k
. Furthermore, each message flow also consists of the identity of the message owner. This could first enable the protocol to be able to run under the post-specified peer setting [13] (i.e., without knowing the identity or public key of the communication partner). On the second, including the identities in the session key computation could resist with the unknown key share attacks [14] . Consider the case that the adversary replaces the public key pk id 3 with pk id 1 , i.e., pk id 3 = pk id 1 . Then the adversary masquerades as id 3 to execute a session interacting with the session π . As a result, the party id 2 would mistakenly believe the session key is shared with id 3 . But the party id 1 ends up believing that she shares a session key with id 2 . In particular, the oracles π share the same session key, i.e., K
. Readers can check this problem themselves. More specifically, our improved scheme is shown in Figure 2 . Theorem 1. Suppose that the pseudo-random function family PRF is (d, t, PRF )-secure, the noninteractive key exchange scheme NIKE is (t, NIKE )-secure, and the deterministic signature scheme SIG is (d, t, SIG )-secure, as defined in Section2. Then the proposed protocol is (t , AKE )-sessionkey-secure such that t ≈ t and
Proof. Generally speaking, we are going to gradually reduce the security of our proposed scheme to that of the underlying building blocks. The proof is shown by a series of games. Let S ξ be the event that the adversary wins the security experiment in Game ξ, and ADV ξ := Pr[S ξ ]−1/2 denote the advantage of A in Game ξ.
Game 0. The first game is the real security experiment. Thus we have that
All queries in this game are simulated honestly in terms of the protocol specification. Specifically, each Corrupt(id i , pk * ) query returns the long-term key sk id i = (sk . The challenger could check the abort rule when the Test query is asked. If the challenger aborts with overwhelming probability, then we could construct an efficient signature forger F to break the security of SIG by running the adversary A as a subroutine. To do this, F simulates as the AKE challenger for A as in Game 1 but with a few modifications. F first guesses the partner id j of the test oracle at the beginning of the game. If F fails in this guess, it aborts the game. The probability of such correct guess is at least 1/ . In the following, we assume that the guess of F is right. Note that F is given a challenge signature verification key vk sig * by the signature challenger. The signature verification key of id j is assigned as vk sig id j := vk sig * . All other long-term key pairs in this game are generated by F honestly following the protocol specification. This implies that F knows all honest parties' long-term secret keys except for sk sig id j . Meanwhile, F can compute all protocol messages which are non-related to sk sig id j . As for each signature of id j , F queries the signing oracle SIG(sk sig * , ·) with an input epk t id j (which is generated by F). So far, the simulation of F is perfect.
When the test oracle π s * id i receives a tuple (epk id j , σ id j ) such that σ id j is a valid signature for epk id j with respect to vk sig id j but (epk id j , σ id j ) is not any tuple recorded in SList. Then, F could win in the signature security experiment by outputting (epk id j , σ id j ). By applying the security of the signature scheme, we have that
As a result, the test oracle π s * id i in this game always has an origin-oracle π z * id j before the party id j is corrupted.
Game 2. The challenger proceeds as the previous game but it does the following two modifications:
• Generate all + d NIKE key pairs {pk i , sk i } i∈[ + d] (which may used later as either long-term or ephemeral key) at the beginning of the security experiment;
The first change is possible for an ORKE protocol. Since each oracle's protocol message (including ephemeral key) is independently generated. The second change could ensure that there is no collision among all NIKE key pairs during the subsequent AKE security experiment. It is straightforward to see that if the above abort event occurs with non-negligible probability. Then we can construct an efficient algorithm E to break the NIKE scheme as follows. Instead of generating all NIKE keys on its own, E generates each NIKE public key pk τ via asking a RegH(τ ) query. When there are two NIKE public keys, e.g., pk i and pk j , such that i = j but pk i = pk j , E can break the NIKE security as follows:
• Ask a Test nike (i, z) query with indexes such that i = z = j, to get a challenge NIKE shared key K nike * ;
• Ask a EXT(j) query to get the secret key sk j which is identical to sk i ;
• If ShKey(sk j , pk z ) = K nike * then return 1, otherwise return 0.
Note that all NIKE public keys generated in the above way have the same distribution as in the previous game. Due to the security of the NIKE scheme, the abort event would not occur with overwhelming probability. So that we have that
In this game, all NIKE key pairs are uniquely generated. This also implies that the test oracle always has a unique origin-oracle, thanks to the uniqueness of each ephemeral NIKE key.
Game 3. Note that the adversary is not allowed to ask RevealKey query to the test oracle or its partner oracle (if it exists). But the RevealEphKey and Corrupt queries have various combinations in terms of the oracle freshness definition. Namely, we have the following disjointed freshness cases:
• C1: A does not query both RevealEphKey(id i , s * ) and RevealEphKey(id j , z * ).
• C2 : A does not query both Corrupt(id i , pk * ) and RevealEphKey(id j , z * ).
• C3 : A does not query both Corrupt(id i , pk * ) and Corrupt(id j , pk * ).
• C4 : A does not query both RevealEphKey(id i , s * ) and Corrupt(id j , pk * ).
Note that only one of the above cases will occur in each simulation of the security experiment. Each freshness case is associated with at least two (either long-term or ephemeral) NIKE secret keys which are uncompromised by the adversary. We change this game from the previous game by adding an another abort rule. Namely, the challenger aborts if it fails to guess (at the beginning of the game): (i) the test oracle and its originoracle, and (ii) one of the above freshness cases. Since there are 4 fresh cases and parties at all, and at most d oracles for each party, then the probability of a correct guess is at least 1/4(d )
2 . Thus we have that ADV 2 ≤ 4(d ) 2 · ADV 3 .
Conclusion
We conclude that the BJS scheme is not secure in the eCK-PFS model. A PFS attack has been shown, which enables us to falsify the security proof of the BJS scheme. An improved scheme has been proposed with a slight modification. We hope our results would help researchers to avoid similar problems while considering the security for one-round key exchange protocol.
